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ESSAYS

THE DOMINANT SOCIETY'S JUDICIAL RELUCTANCE TO
ALLOW TRIBAL CIVIL LAW TO APPLY TO NON-INDIANS:
RESERVATION DIMINISHMENT, MODERN DEMOGRAPHY
AND THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
Robert Laurence*
INTRODUCTION

Begin at the beginning: there was a time, not so long ago as
such things are reckoned-say, about half as long as there has
been a country called Hungary-during which only American
Indians lived in and around what is now the Commonwealth of
Virginia. A time when Europeans, Africans and Asians were
entirely occupied with managing the affairs of Europe, Africa
and Asia, to mixed effect. A time when the subject of this article was entirely theoretical; when the question of applying tribal law to non-Indians was answered neither "yes" or "no" but
simply did not arise, putting aside the welcome, or not, given
the odd Scandinavian.'
* Robert A. Leflar Professor of Law, University of Arkansas.
1. Distinguish from this issue of the application of Native American law to nonNative Americans, the issue of whether the law of one tribe applies to members of
another tribe, or Indians who are members of no tribe. The latter jurisdiction has
existed, the mind of man runneth not to the contrary, at least not since the Bering
Strait froze over, say for the last 10,000 years, give or take a few thousand. This distinction, understandable, one would think, by the average eighth grader, was not fully
appreciated by the United States Supreme Court in its famous cases limiting the
reach of tribal criminal jurisdiction. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (a tribe
has no criminal jurisdiction over Indians who are not members of the prosecuting
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Now, of course, the tables have turned; there are no federally
recognized Indian tribes that have land within Virginia.2 So
the subject of this article is theoretical here, though still practical west of here.3
It is, and always has been, a principle of American federal
law that federally recognized tribes are governments, engaged
in the various and diverse acts of self-government, and are not
merely private, voluntary organizations.4 True enough, this
dominant-society commitment to tribal sovereignty has ebbed
and flowed over the years,5 and each time that, during the ebb,
the commitment loses force, it never quite regains all that was
lost, during the flow. Now, the tribes as governments are mere
shadows of their pre-Columbian selves. Although there may be
few Native Americans, 6 they are about to enter the twenty-first
century with something that no other minority group in this
country has, and which few minority groups in the world have:
"[T]he right.., to make their own laws and be ruled by
them."7 As Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote for the unanimous

tribe) (extending Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (holding a
tribe has no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians)).
2. This is far from saying that there are no Indians in Virginia. Some of them
are members of tribes from the West; one of those is a United States Senator. Others
are members of tribes not recognized by either the state or federal government. There
are also two small state recognized reservations-the Mattaponi and Pamunkey reservations-not far from Richmond, but this article will not be discussing the law as it
applies to non-federally recognized tribes.
3. Not so far west, in the case of the Cherokees, Seminoles and other remnants
of tribes that were "removed" to Oklahoma and the West in the mid-1800s. Federally
recognized reservations remain in North Carolina, Florida, Alabama and Mississippi.
Likewise, a few Indians stayed behind north and east of here, and there are federally
recognized reservations in New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island and Maine.
4. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) (tribes are
"domestic dependent nations"); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975) (tribes
are "a good deal more than 'private, voluntary organizations'"); United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (tribes are sovereigns independent of the United States
for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. Constitution).
5. See generally DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 41-288 (3d ed.
1993).
6. A couple of million is the usual estimate; that is to say somewhat less than
1% of the country's population. See id. at 13. Of course, it depends on how you
count, which is an active issue in Indian law. See P.S. Deloria & Robert Laurence,
What's an Indian?: A Conversation about Law School Admissions, Indian Tribal Sovereignty and Affirmative Action, 44 ARK. L. REV. 1107 (1991).
7. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
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Court in 1973, "It must always be remembered that the various
Indian tribes were once independent and sovereign nations, and
that their claim to sovereignty long predates that of our own
Government." 8 The question, then, becomes whether the "right
to make their own laws and be ruled by them" includes the
right to make laws and enforce them against all those who visit
their lands, including non-Indians, or "non-citizens," if you will,
given the "nationhood" to which Justice Marshall referred.
The analogous question is easily answered when the nations
referred to are foreign states; the laws of a foreign state apply
to non-citizen residents and visitors. The question is just as
easily answered when the "self-governing" entity is a private,
voluntary organization; the laws and bylaws of the Rotary Club,
for example, apply only to Rotarians.
With respect to states of the federal Union, the answer is
only marginally more complex; the laws of Virginia apply to a
non-Virginian visitor, except to the extent that they are overridden by the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment or other such
pre-eminent principles of federal law, including federal statutes
or treaties entitled to supremacy. Pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment, I am a citizen of the United States and of Arkansas, but when I visit Virginia, I am treated more or less as if I
were a Virginian.9
With respect to Indian tribes, there are three additional layers of complexity concerning the application of their own laws
to non-member residents and visitors. First is the question of
whether the tribe seeks to apply its own law to non-Indians.
Some tribes disclaim such power under their own constitutions,
statutes or common law;' ° others might have the theoretical
5. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n. of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
9. I am a citizen of the United States by virtue of the fact that I was born
here, and of Arkansas by virtue of the fact that I reside there. "All persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens
of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." U.S. CONST. amend. X1V,
§ 1.
Interestingly enough, while I was born in Newport News, Virginia, I know of
no legal benefit from the Commonwealth of Virginia that derives from that fact.
10. See, e.g., Nelson v. DuBois, 232 N.W.2d 54, 56 (N.D. 1975) (citing Chapter I,
§ 1.2(c) of the Code of Laws of the Devil's Lake Sioux Tribe).
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power but never exercise it. Other tribes are in the opposite
position." Generalities are dangerous; as P.S. Deloria says,
there is more variation among the laws, customs and practices
of North American Indian tribes than there is among the various nations of Europe.' I will leave aside for the remainder of
this essay the difficult question of what the law of any particular tribe is, and will concentrate on the situation where a
tribe seeks to exercise its jurisdiction to the full extent allowed
by both tribal and federal law.
The second layer of complexity relates to the fact that there
is a substantial connection between the extent of a tribe's power and the extent of the tribe's lands. The extent of the tribe's
lands, in turn, is subject to the will of Congress and the Administration. Reservations are subject to defeasance by the
United States acting alone," and with the loss of land goes
the loss of tribal power over the land. A tribe might still retain
power over residents and visitors to its land, but the land base
can be made smaller at any time by the federal government.
Hence, any inquiry
involves the question
cise jurisdiction over
course, a geographical

regarding tribal power over non-Indians
whether the tribe is attempting to exera reservation controversy. There is, of
component to the reach of every nation's

11. See Oliphant v. Suquanish Indian Tribe, U.S. 191 (1978) (prosecution of nonIndian by tribe).
12. This observation is truly Sam Delorian: important, novel, insightful, profound
and, when one thinks of it, nearly self-evident. "Of course. Why didn't I think of
that?" I regularly use it, often without attribution, see, e.g., Robert Laurence, The
Bothersome Need for Asymmetry in Any Federally Dictated Rule of Recognition for the
Enforcement of Money Judgments Across Indian Reservation Boundaries, 27 CONN. L.
REV. 979, 987 (1995). I appreciate the opportunity in this footnote to set the record
straight.
But, of course, it is not the kind of statement that is susceptible to
quantification and proof, except for this: visit Palm Springs, California and Mission,
South Dakota, then visit Paris, France, and Oslo, Norway, and let me know what you
think of the comparisons.
And, of course, differences and similarities are in the eye of the beholder. See
S'pore and Utah society have much in common: BG Yeo, THE (SINGAPORE) STRArrs
TIMES, April 6, 1996, at p.3, col. 1 ("Much like Utah, Singapore sustained itself because it worried every day about the breakdown of the family and crime.")
13. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 423-24 (1980) (holding
that the United States may be liable before its own court of claims for such abrogations, but the case did not question the existence of the power in the United States
to abrogate its treaty with the Sioux).
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power, Indian or not. This is not to say, however, that any
nation is strictly limited to its own land in the exercise of its
power. For example, civil long-arm statutes allow a sovereign to
reach beyond its boundaries in order to enter judgments against
defendants who are no longer on the sovereign's land. The same
should be true of the long-arm reach of tribal power. However,
practical enforcement of these legitimate judgments may be
problematic. Tribal judgments, if valid, may or may not have
off-reservation force under a variety of Full Faith and Credit
theories.14 But underlying either of these extra-territorial applications of tribal force is the question of whether the tribe
properly may apply its law to the merits of the underlying controversy, which in turn implicates the question of whether that
controversy was on-reservation or off-reservation.
The third complexity to the application of tribal law to nonIndian residents of and visitors to the reservation flows from
the fact that all aspects of tribal power, including the narrow
question of the applicability of tribal law to non-Indians, are
susceptible to unilateral diminishment by the federal government' and to voluntary surrender by the tribes themselves.'6
Beginning with the notorious--or venerable, depending on one's
perspective-Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,'7 it became
a further requirement that the exercise of tribal power not be
"inconsistent with
[the tribe's dependent] status" under federal
8
common law.
Oliphant dealt an apparently fatal blow to the exercise of
tribal criminal power over non-Indians, but on the civil regulatory and adjudicatory side, the question rapidly became less
clear cut, to the advantage of the tribes. For example, in KerrMcGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians,' the Court held that

14. Several competing models for resolution of the "full faith and credit" problem
are set out in an article by Richard E. Ransom, and others. See Richard E. Ransom
et al., Recognizing and Enforcing State and Tribal Judgments: A Roundtable Discussion of Law, Policy and Practice, 18 AM. IND. L. REV. 239 (1993).
15. This usually occurs through statutes.
16. This usually occurs through treaties.
17. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
18. Id. at 208 (quoting Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1007-09 (9th Cir.
1976)).
19. 471 U.S. 195 (1985).
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tribes have the power to tax non-Indians doing business on the
reservation. This was true even in the face of a contract that
firmly set the non-tax payments owed the tribe and even in the
absence of the approval of the tax by the United States.
Thus, a knotty problem is presented by the question of
whether and in what circumstances an Indian tribe may apply
its own laws to non-Indians. In this essay, I will assume away
the first complexity. Suppose a tribe wishes to exercise civilside jurisdiction over non-Indians, and suppose further that it is
permitted to do so under its own laws, as interpreted by its
own courts. And so, we may turn our attention to the other two
complications, that is, to the extent of the tribe's reservation
and the extent of the tribe's power. I will find these two inquiries related.
One final, introductory observation before I begin: While I
will be exploring the farthest reaches of tribal power over nonIndians, I do so as a law professor whose ancestors are from
Europe. I do not live in, nor practice law in, Indian country,
except in the most capacious sense of that term. My ideas,
then, are moderated neither by the tribal leader's personal
appreciation of the off-reservation political ramifications of farreaching tribal jurisdiction, nor by the notion that the reach I
am proposing will affect my own day-to-day, off-reservation,
non-Indian life. I have tried to anticipate these sensibilities,
and my proposals are, in fact, pretty moderate, but not, I admit, because I live the rules I propose. I begin with the issue of
legislative diminishment of the size of a reservation by statute.
BARTLETT

0

AND HAGEN2

In 1979, John Bartlett, a member of the Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe, was charged by the State of South Dakota with
attempted rape. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to state
prison. While incarcerated, he sought federal habeas corpus
against Herman Solem, his warden. The district court granted

20. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984).
21. Hagen v. Utah, 114 S. Ct. 958 (1994).
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the petition; the Eighth Circuit affirmed; and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari.22
The only issue in the case was whether the crime was committed on the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation. If it was,
then federal criminal jurisdiction would attach and would preempt state criminal jurisdiction, resulting in the granting of the
petition.' If the crime occurred off-reservation, then there
would be no federal jurisdiction (and therefore, no federal preemption) and the state prosecution would have been proper; in
which case Bartlett would remain in the state jail.
The question of whether the crime occurred on- or off-reservation, in turn, depended on where the boundaries of the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation were at the time of the crime. If
the boundaries were as originally established in 1868 and 1889,
then the crime was a federal offense by virtue of being committed on-reservation, and Bartlett would go free from state
detention. However, in 1908, Congress statutorily opened the
reservation for white settlement, and the question became
whether Congress had thereby reduced the size of the reservation, making the crime committed seventy-one years later offreservation.
In 1989, Robert Hagen, who is apparently an Indian,' was
charged by the State of Utah with the distribution of a controlled substance. He pleaded guilty, but later challenged the
state court's jurisdiction. Hagen argued that his alleged crime
was committed on the Uintah Indian Reservation; hence, federal jurisdiction would be exclusive over that of the state. The
Utah state trial court denied the challenge, and the intermediate appellate court reversed. The Utah Supreme Court reversed
again, holding that the crime had not occurred on the reservation. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari."

22. Bartlett, 465 U.S. at 465-66.
23. See, e.g., United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978).
24. The state trial court had initially determined that Robert Hagen was not an
Indian, but that determination was reversed by the state intermediate appellate court
and was not before the Supreme Court. See Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 964.
25. Id.
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Again, the jurisdictional question turned on the location of
the reservation boundary. The crime had been committed within the boundary of the reservation as originally established in

1861, but various acts of the executive branch and Congress in
the early 1900s made it unclear whether the original boundary
was still in place.2 6 If the original boundary was not in place,
then Hagen's crime, committed more than eighty years after
the reservation was opened for white settlement, was a state
offense, rather than a federal one.
It is plain from these statements of Bartlett and Hagen that
the issue in both cases (and their predecessors") was one of
the construction of statutes and executive orders: the Act of
May 29, 1908, in the case of the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation in South Dakota, and a more complicated set of enactments and orders in the case of the Uintah Reservation in
Utah. Justice O'Connor, speaking for a divided Court in Hagen,

and relying on Justice Thurgood Marshall's opinion for the
unanimous Court in Bartlett, stated the appropriate statutory
construction analysis this way:
In determining whether a reservation has been diminished,
"[o]ur precedents in the area have established a fairly clean
analytical structure," directing us to look to three factors.
The most probative evidence of diminishment is, of course,
the statutory language used to open the Indian lands. We
have also considered the historical context surrounding the
passage of the surplus land Acts, although we have been
careful to distinguish between evidence of the contemporaneous understanding of the particular Act and matters
occurring subsequent to the Act's passage. Finally, "[o]n a
more pragmatic level, we have recognized that who actually
moved onto opened reservation lands is also relevant to
deciding whether a surplus land Act diminished a reservation." Throughout the inquiry, we resolve any ambiguities
in favor of the Indians, and we will not lightly find diminishment."

26. Id. at 966-68.
27. See generally Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962); Mattz v.
Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973); DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975);

Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977).
28. Hagen, 114 S.Ct. at 965 (citations omitted). Both of Justice O'Connor's quo-
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Much might be written about this analytical scheme, especially on the questions of whether the first element-the inspection of the statutory language-changes the old rules of the
construction of statutes diminishing Indians' rights, and whether the new rules, if there are new rules, conform to the other
new rules the Court is formulating regarding statutory construction. 9 I will not be adding to that discussion in this essay. Nor will I be looking at the second element of Justice
O'Connor's analytical scheme-the role played by contemporaneous history in the interpretation of statutes. My interest lies in
the interplay between the third element-the role of present
demography in determining the meaning of the statute-and
how it relates to the fourth element-the oft-stated reluctance
of the Court to find a reservation to be diminished in size.
DEMOGRAPHICS AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

The logical relationship between the question of what Congress meant when it legislated many years ago and the ethnicity of the people who now live on or near the reservation has
always been attenuated, at best. Justice Thurgood Marshall's
Bartlett decision is brimming with self-consciousness over the
very suggestion of a link between the two:
On a more pragmatic level, we have recognized that who
actually moved onto opened reservation lands is also relevant ....

In addition to the obvious practical advantages of

acquiescing to the de facto diminishment, we look to the
subsequent demographic history of opened lands as one

tations come from Bartlett.
29. Hagen was sharply criticized by Professor Alex Tallchief Skibine of the University of Utah, Professor Frank Pommersheim of the University of South Dakota and
Professor N. Bruce Duthu of the Vermont Law School in James M. Grijalva et al.,
Diminishment of Indian Reservations: Legislative or Judicial Fiat?, 71 N.D. L. REv.
415, 416-32 (1995) [hereinafter Diminishment]. These remarks were in reaction to
Robert Laurence, The Unseemly Nature of Reservation Diminishment by Judicial, as
Opposed to Legislative, Fiat and the Ironic Role of the Indian Civil Rights Act in
Limiting Both, 71 N.D. L. REV. 393 (1995), in which I gave some praise to Hagen;
"praise" in the sense of it being a better decision than Bourland, which is discussed
below.
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additional clue as to what Congress expected would happen.... Resort to subsequent demographic history is, of
course, an unorthodox and potentially unreliable method of
statutory interpretation ... [but] the technique is a necessary expedient . . . "There are, of course, limits to how far

we will go ..
Oddly enough, in the face of all of this apprehension about
using present demography as a tool in statutory construction, in
the end it is about the only thing that the Court found "clear"
in Bartlett, on its way to finding that the Cheyenne River Sioux
Reservation had not been diminished." And, the conclusion in
Hagen that the Uintah Reservation had been diminished was,
at least, "not controverted" by present demography. 2 In fact,
as pointed out most recently by Professor Frank Pommersheim
of the University of South Dakota, present demography is about
the only consistent bit of analysis discernible to a student of
the diminishment cases.33 If the land in controversy is owned
today primarily by Indians-as was true in Seymour v. Superintendent,34 Mattz v. Arnett" and Bartlett-the reservation was
not diminished years ago by statute, while, if the land is owned
today primarily by whites-as was true in DeCoteau v. District
County Court,6 Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip 7 and
Hagen-the reservation was diminished years ago by statute.
As Justice O'Connor thought it relevant to note in Hagen: "[Wie
found it significant in [Bartlett] that the seat of tribal govern30. Bartlett, 465 U.S. at 471-72 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 479-80. Tassie Hanna and I concluded in an earlier article that the
unique clarity of demography will not be unlikely in these cases, given the vagaries
of the other elements in the Bartlett test-how "clear," for example, will the "contemporaneous history" ever be? See Tassie Hanna & Robert Laurence, Justice Thurgood
Marshall and the Problem of Indian Treaty Abrogation, 40 ARK. L. REV. 797, 815
(1987).
32. See Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 970.
33. "[Ihf you want an accurate predictor about the results in the case, don't look
at what the legislation says, just go to the demographics. In a diminishment case you
can have absolute certainty of result by checking out the demographics. If the demographics are unfavorable to Indians, they will lose. And rm hard put to see how that
could ever be a principled decision." Diminishment, supra note 29, at 421-22 (remarks
of Professor Pommersheim).
34. 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
35. 412 U.S. 481 (1973).
36. 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
37. 430 U.S. 584 (1977).
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ment was located on opened lands."" In contrast are the present demographics of the land at issue in Hagen:
The current population of the area is approximately 85
percent non-Indian .... The population of the largest city

in the area-Roosevelt City, named for the President who
opened the Reservation for [white] settlement-is about 93
percent non-Indian [and the] seat of Ute tribal government
is in Fort Duchesne, which is situated on Indian trust
lands.39
Consistent with its self-consciousness in Bartlett, the majority
in Hagen made but little attempt to find a principled, as opposed to a practical, relationship between present demographics
and the construction of old statutes. Justice O'Connor began
her discussion with a quote from Bartlett that emphasizes what
the Court sees as the practicalities involved: "We have recognized that '[wihen an area is predominantly populated by nonIndians with only a few surviving pockets of Indian allotments,
finding that the land remains Indian country seriously burdens
the administration of state and local governments."4" And she
ended the discussion on the same practical bent: "[T]he current
population situation in the Uintah Valley demonstrates a practical acknowledgement that the Reservation was diminished; a
contrary conclusion would seriously disrupt the justifiable expectations of the people living in the area."4 '
This last sentence shows how law and grammar can become
intertwined, for one is tempted to ask, "A 'practical
acknowledgement' by whom?" It is very difficult to find a "practical acknowledgment" by Congress, either early in this century
or more recently, which would seem to take the inquiry immediately out of the realm of statutory construction, where it

38. Hagen, 114 S. Ct. 970 (citing Bartlett, 465 U.S. at 480).
39. Id. (citing 1990 Census of Population and Housing Summary Population and

Housing Characteristics: Utah, 1990 CPH-1-46, Table 17 at 73 and Table 3 at 13). I
have added the word "white" to the quotation; perhaps the Court thought it went
without saying. But, I am willing to be generous toward Justice O'Connor's lapse and
assume that she is not suggesting that, in 1903, the Indians were not "settled" on
the land.
40. Id. (quoting Bartlett, 465 U.S. at 471-72, n.12 (emphasis added)).
41. Id. at 970 (emphasis added).
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belongs. Any importance of a "practical acknowledgement" by
the state of Utah in the face of a conflicting federal determination is contrary to the notions of pre-emption and supremacy. A
"practical acknowledgement" by the white persons who live on
the land would seem both theoretically irrelevant and contrary
to the undoubted "practical acknowledgement" in the other
direction by the tribe itself and its members, the latter being
demonstrated pretty clearly by the current litigation.
We are left, then, with the Supreme Court itself being the
missing prepositional object in the sentence. The Court, apparently, has made its own "practical acknowledgement" that the
reservation was diminished because "a contrary conclusion
would seriously disrupt the justifiable expectations of the people
living in the area."42 What "expectations," and why are they
"justifiable"? The "expectations" of the whites apparently are
that, as off-reservation residents, they are not subject to tribal
authority. And, as I will discuss below, the Court might be
reluctant to allow tribal law to apply to non-Indians, and this
reluctance translates into what the Court sees as the
justifiability of the white expectations. Hence, the Court is
reluctant to cause such a disruption on its own. But, if it is a
statute that is being construed, then it is Congress, with due
deliberation, that caused whatever disruption ensues.
Justice Marshall, in Bartlett, labeled modern demography
only one "clue" to the underlying meaning of a statute and, selfconsciously, listed it as the last element in the analysis.' So
we are cautioned not to equate statutory construction with
census gathering. But-mixing metaphors here-the clue threatens to become the trump card when the Court uses its own
reluctance to disrupt the demographic status quo to interpret a
decades-old statute. And as Professor Pommersheim notes, '
when modern demography becomes the only reliable predictor of
the different constructions given to similar statutes, then the
trump card has been played and the hand taken.

42. Id.
43. Bartlett, 465 U.S. at 471.
44. See Diminishment, supra note 29, at 421-22.
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In the end, I need give no appraisal of modern demography
as an aid to statutory construction beyond Justice Marshall's
appraisal--"unorthodox and potentially unreliable."'
Some
might go further, perhaps to "irrelevant and potentially illogical." Professor Pommersheim said "totally irrational [and] I'm
hard put to see how that could ever be a principled decision."'
Professor Skibine was equally harsh: "Any test that starts by
saying that it is looking for 'clear' indications of congressional
intent and then lists, as a factor in determining [that], the
present day demographics of the reservation cannot legitimately
talk in terms of clear indications of congressional intent."47
But, for my purposes here, "unorthodox and potentially unreliable" will do, for that is enough to make one puzzle about why
the "unorthodox" has become a standard tool of statutory construction and why the "potentially unreliable" is the most reliable predictor of results.
The explanation, I think, is found in judicial reluctance.
JUDICIAL RELUCTANCE AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

There are certain supposed canons of statutory construction
in cases involving Indians, a complete discussion of which is
both beyond the scope of this article and untimely.' Rather, I
will focus on one of the canons, stated most forthrightly in
Bartlett:
Diminishment [of Indian reservations] will not be lightly
inferred.... When both an act and its legislative history
fail to provide substantial and compelling evidence of a
congressional intention to diminish Indian lands, we are
bound by our traditional solicitude for the Indian tribes to

45. Bartlett, 465 U.S. at 472 n.13.
46. See Diminishment, supra note 29, at 422.

47. Id. at 417.
48. See generally DAVID H. GETCHES, ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 345-48 (3d

ed.

1993); Philip P. Frickey, MarshallingPast and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism,
and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REv. 381, 424-25 (1993);
Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As Long As Water Flows or Grass Grows upon the Earth"--How Long a Time is
That?, 63 CAL. L. REV. 601 (1975).
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rule that diminishment did not take place and that the old
reservation boundaries survived the opening.49
And again in the holding of the case: "The presumption that
Congress did not intend to diminish the Reservation therefore
stands, and the judgment of the Eighth Circuit is affirmed." 0
This "traditional solicitude" for the tribes, this "presumption"
against diminishment, this "no light inference" rule all may be
combined to form a certain judicial reluctance to find that Congress had diminished the size of a reservation, which reluctance
can only be overcome by a precise enough congressional enactment.
Justice O'Connor, in Hagen, agreed that such judicial reluctance is appropriate: "Throughout the inquiry, we resolve any
ambiguities in favor of the Indians, and we will not lightly find
diminishment.""' But for this proposition, she cited two cases
that were hardly monuments to the reluctance of the Court to
52
limit the reach of tribal power: South Dakota v. Bourland,
which restricted tribal power on the Cheyenne River Sioux
Reservation, and County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and
Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation," which held that the
County of Yakima, Washington, could tax certain on-reservation
lands.
The two cited cases "talked the talk" of judicial reluctance to
cut back on tribal power. For instance, the Court stated in
County of Yakima: "[S]tatutes are to be construed liberally in
favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to
their benefit."54 But "walking the reluctant walk" is another
matter, and the problem is that Justice O'Connor's opinion for
the Hagen majority does not feel very reluctant. The opinion
mentions this reluctance once and then leaves it be. Compare
this to Bartlett, in which the Court began and ended its opinion
with expressions of acted-upon reluctance. Hagen begins its

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Bartlett, 465 U.S. at 470, 472 (emphasis added).
Id. at 481 (emphasis added).
Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 965 (citing Bartlett, 465 U.S. at 471).
113 S. Ct. 2309 (1993); see infra Part VI.
112 S.Ct. 683 (1992).
Id. at 693 (quoting Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985)).
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analysis: "[I]t is settled law that some surplus land Acts diminished reservations... ," ends with the diminishment and buries reluctance along the way.55
Justice Blackmun, in his Hagen dissent, and similarly in his
dissents in Yakima County and Bourland, accused the majorities of paying mere lip service to the canons of reluctance to
diminish reservations and willingness to resolve ambiguities in
favor of the tribes. Taken to its logical extreme, Justice
Blackmun's observation might require the majority to reformulate the canons themselves, to the eventual detriment of the
tribes. I generally dislike the extreme, and will not be doing
that reformulation. For the moment at least, it is unnecessary;
the Court continues to state the reluctant canon as a guidepost
to Indian law.
DEMOGRAPHICS AND JuDIcIAL RELUCTANCE

So, when Hagen and Bartlett are viewed side-by-side, they
present an odd, and for many, discouraging tableau of American
Indian law. Together, they set forth a largely nonsensical role
for modern demography to play in the construction of decadesold statutes. Together, they exhibit an on-again, off-again canon
of judicial reluctance to diminish the size of Indian reservations
without fairly precise congressional guidance. But, the ludicrous
and lukewarm become understandable when read together;
judicial reluctance to diminish is a function of modern demography. The modern demography of the land on or near the reservation-precisely, the race of those who live there-seems to
function for the Court as a judicial rheostat, which varies the
potency of the reluctance to diminish. I shall return to this
thought below.
BARTLETT AND BOURLAND

But first reconsider Bartlett, this time side-by-side with South
Dakota v. Bourland." Bourland, like Bartlett, involved the ju55. Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 965.
56. 113 S. Ct. 2309 (1993).
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risdictional rules on the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation,
which reservation Bartlett had unanimously held not to be
diminished in the Hagen sense. That is to say, the Supreme
Court in Bartlett had answered the question of whether Congress had, by opening the reservation to white settlement in
1908, diminished the size of the reservation down to the Indian
allotments, and the answer had been against diminishment.
Hence, the reservation retained its 1908 boundary.
In 1954, pursuant to the Cheyenne River Act, the United
States purchased more than 100,000 acres of reservation land
to construct the Oahe Dam and Reservoir, paying more than
$10,000,000. At an early stage of the Bourland litigation, the
state of South Dakota argued that, notwithstanding Bartlett,
this 1954 Act had diminished the reservation in the Hagen
sense. The federal district court's holding against the state was
not 58
appealed;" that holding, then, became the law of the
case.
As South Dakota pursued its injunctive and declaratory action against the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe's regulation of,
and in some cases exclusion of, non-Indian hunters and fishermen from the Oahe Reservoir, it was working against two
unchallengeable holdings that the Reservoir was on the undiminished Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation. The state argued,
and prevailed before the Supreme Court, that notwithstanding
the reservation status of the Reservoir, the tribe's power did
not reach the non-Indians recreating there.
Thus, while the Hagen and Bartlett decisions together reveal
the rules of reservation diminishment, Bourland and Bartlett
together reveal the rules governing tribal power over non-Indians on undiminished reservations. Those 59rules come largely
from the case of Montana v. United States.
Montana was a case that grudgingly accepted the power of
Indian tribes over non-Indians. As paraphrased by Justice
Thomas for the majority in Bourland:

57. See id. at 2321 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 2314.
59. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
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Montana discussed two exceptions to the general proposition
that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do
not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe.
First, a tribe may license or otherwise regulate activities of
nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the
tribe or its members through contracts, leases, or other
commercial dealings. Second, a tribe may retain inherent
power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of nonIndians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of
the tribe.'
Justice Thomas indulged in the now-customary characterization of the Montana test as a presumption against tribal inherent power, with two exceptions. The test could just as easily be
seen as two potentially huge domains of tribal inherent power,
with a prohibition for power applied outside those domains.
Consider, for example, the following statement from a recent
law review article by Phillip Lear and Blake Miller, who discuss the powers of a tribe which owns the surface, but not the
mineral estate, of reservation land:
On the other hand, the tribe does not own the mineral
estate. The tribe derives no economic benefit from development of the minerals, other than possible surface access
fees when lessees are required to cross adjacent Indian
lands to gain access to the inholdings.... The only real
interest the tribe has is to ensure that the political integrity, economic security, health or welfare of the tribe will not
be affected
adversely [by the development of the miner6
als] . 1
The only real interest? Why the discounting words? A
tribe's-or for that matter, any government's-interest in "political integrity, economic security, health and welfare" is strong
and broad. What does a government do that is not connected to
those four items, broadly read? Taxation? Garbage collection?

60. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2320 (citations omitted).

61. Phillip Wm. Lear & Blake D. Miller, Exhaustion of Tribal Court Remedies:
Rejecting Bright-Line Rules and Affirmative Action, 71 N.D. L. REV. 277, 308 (1995)
(citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981)).
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Land-use regulation? Environmental protection? Compulsory

school attendance? Conservation of reservation resources? Gun
control? Drug prohibition? Road building? Regulation of the sale
of alcohol? In fact, since those four elements are a fair characterization of what most governments do most of the time, the
presumption of the Montana test could easily be formulated in
exactly the opposite way, in favor of, not opposition to, tribal
power.
However, Justice Thomas, in Bourland, was emphatic that
the presumption of Montana is against tribal civil jurisdiction
over non-Indians. In fact, he was overly emphatic. Consider
footnote sixteen, a rather petulant marginal note:
The dissent's complaint that we give "barely a nod" to
the Tribe's inherent sovereignty argument is simply another
manifestation of its disagreement with Montana, which
announced "the general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe." While the dissent refers to
our "myopic focus" on the Tribe's prior treaty right to "absolute and undisturbed use and occupation" of the taken
area, it shuts both eyes to the reality that after Montana,
tribal sovereignty over nonmembers "cannot survive without
express congressional delegation," and is therefore not inherent.62
But Justice Thomas's own quotation from Montana, which
immediately follows this footnote in the text of Bourland, shows
that tribal sovereignty over non-Indians is inherent, and does
not need express congressional delegation: "[A] tribe may retain
inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of
non-Indians."" So, in the text tribal power is inherent, and in
the footnote it is not, with Justice Thomas emphasizing that it
is not inherent. Given the general primacy of text over footnote,
and the unseemliness of the anti-collegial jousting within the
footnote, I will follow the text, notwithstanding the emphasis,
until instructed otherwise.'
62. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2320 n.15 (citations omitted) (emphasis in the
original).
63. Id. at 2320.
64. See Contrarians, NAT. RESOURCES & THE ENV'T, WINTER 1993, at 52 (an ex-
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At another place in the Bourland majority opinion, a footnote
again contradicts the text as Justice Thomas takes a surly
swipe at the dissenters. Consider footnote ten:
The dissent apparently finds ambiguity in this provision,
on the grounds that it "does not address the question of
which rights Congress intended to take." The self-evident
answer is that when Congress used the term "all claims,
rights, and demands" of the Tribe, it meant all claims,
rights and demands. 5
But now read the sentence to which that footnote is subtended: "This provision reliably indicates that the Government and
the Tribe understood the Act to embody the full terms of their
Agreement, including the various rights that the Tribe and its
members would continue to enjoy after conveying the 104,420
acres to the Government."6 6 And, as Justice Thomas wrote at
the end of the opinion: "The Cheyenne River Act reserved some
of the Tribe's original treaty rights in the former trust lands
(including the right to hunt and fish) but not the right to exert
regulatory control.""
To summarize, the text of Bourland twice recognizes that the
Cheyenne River Act specifically destroyed some, but not all, of
the tribe's inherent sovereignty over the Reservoir. Recall, both
Bartlett and the law of the case require that the Reservoir be
reservation land and water. Footnotes ten and sixteen to the
contrary notwithstanding, the issue then became whether the
tribe's inherent sovereignty over the land, which includes, under Montana, the power to regulate the affairs of non-Indians,
survived the Cheyenne River Act, legislation that did not remove the Oahe Reservoir from the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation.
The Eighth Circuit below held that Montana's restriction on
tribal civil power over non-Indians applied only to the relatively

change between this author and Timothy R. Malone and Bradley B. Furber, the latter
being admirers of Bourland).
65. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2317 n.lO (citations omitted) (emphasis in the

original).
66. Id. at 2317.
67. Id. at 2321.
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few acres that had been fee land before the appropriation by
the Cheyenne River Act. The bulk of the appropriated land,
however, had been held in trust by the United States for the
tribe, so that the appropriation had only changed the government from trustee to fee owner, while leaving the land within
the boundary of the reservation. The Eighth Circuit thought
that Montana applied only to fee land, a fair reading of the
case, as noted in Justice Thomas's own quotation: "a 'tribe may
. . . retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the
conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when
that conduct . . . affect[s],"' etc.68 The Supreme Court disagreed in Bourland and extended the reach of Montana to the
trust lands acquired by the government in the Cheyenne River
Act but left on the reservation.
The importance of Bartlett (supplemented by the law of the
case) and Bourland is to clarify that the Montana restrictions
on the reach of tribal power apply even on a reservation undiminished in the Hagen sense. This leads one to speculate on
the meaning of Hagen and Bourland together.
HAGEN AND BOURLAND

Interpreting a federal statute, Hagen held that Congress had
reduced the size of the Uintah Reservation so that Mr. Hagen's
crime was committed off the reservation and state criminal
jurisdiction attached. Thus, the land on which the crime was
committed was not within the reach of tribal jurisdiction.
Interpreting similar statutes, Bartlett held that the Cheyenne
River Sioux Reservation had not been reduced in size, leaving
the land on the reservation. Thus, the prosecution by the state
was improper.
With the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation boundary intact
via Bartlett, Bourland could not deprive the tribe of jurisdiction
via Hagen-style diminishment. Therefore, the court returned the
case to the Eighth Circuit to apply the Montana common law
test for the reach of tribal jurisdiction. I call this Bourland-

68. Id. at 2320 (emphasis added).
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style 'judicial diminishment," as contrasted with the more respectable Hagen-style legislative diminishment.69 Both BartlettHagen and Montana-Bourlandreduce the reach of tribal power
over non-Indians. Thus, in a real sense, both "diminish" the
reservation. Hagen is the more respectable diminishment because it was, ultimately, a congressional diminishment.
Bourland is the less respectable diminishment because the
Court accomplished, under common law, a result practically
indistinguishable from the one that Congress could have accomplished, but chose not to, under the Bartlett holding.
At a recent, wide-ranging symposium, ° Professor
Pommersheim took issue with my North Dakota attempt to link
Hagen and Bourland (please note in advance that what follows
is a transcription of Professor Pommersheim's casual oral remarks, which explains the departure from his always-precise
writing style):
I'll close with a last observation about language. It's not
helpful to me to think about Bourland as involving 'judicial
diminishment" because "diminishment" is firmly implanted
in my own mind as having to do with the boundaries of the
reservation. That's what diminishment means to me. I think
if you think about Bourland as involving "judicial diminishment," I think it is really dangerous. I think a more
accurate term, and Bob sort of provoked me to think about
this, is 'jurisdictional diminishment." That's what the result
of Bourland is, not to reduce the boundaries of the reservation, but to constrict the tribe's jurisdiction. And so I think
it's more accurately thought of as an example of jurisdictional diminishment and not judicial diminishment.7 '
My colleague is certainly correct in two ways. First, he is
right in saying that I want to be talking about "jurisdictional
diminishment." But, as I said at the outset of this paper, I see
two ways for a court to find that the jurisdiction of a tribe has
been diminished: either by removing the land from the reservation under Bartlett-Hagen or by denying the full reach of tribal
69. See Laurence, supra note 29.
70. Indian Law Symposium: Natural Resource Development and Tribal Rights, 71
N.D. L. REV. 273-617 (1995).
71. Diminishment, supra note 29 at 424 (remarks of Professor Pommersheim).
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jurisdiction over reservation land under Montana-Bourland.Second, Professor Pommersheim is right in finding this to be an
unusual way of linking cases; the word "diminishment" is used
by most to mean actual, physical reduction in the size of the
reservation via Bartlett and Hagen. But, it is the perhaps novel
link between Hagen and Bourland (by calling them both "diminishment" cases) that shows the weakness of Bourland. In construing the applicable statute, it is not enough under Hagen,
and never has been under its predecessors, for Congress to
have "opened" the land to white settlement. "The mere fact that
a reservation has been opened to settlement does not necessarily mean that the opened area has lost its reservation status."
Yet Bourland's common law rules seem to turn on that very
kind of "openness":
The District Court found that the taken area is not a
"closed" or pristine area, and the Court of Appeals did not
disturb that finding. We agree that the area at issue here
has been broadly opened to the public. Thus, we need not

reach the issue of a tribe's regulatory authority in other
contexts. 3
Hence, on one important level, Hagen and Bourland are inconsistent. Hagen showed appropriate respect for congressional
legislation, but Bourland destroyed tribal power in the face of a
congressional determination not to reduce the size of the reservation. Congress could have removed the land in question from
the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation, thereby achieving the
Bourland result, but chose not to in both 1908 and 1954. More
broadly, under Hagen and its predecessors, Congress can always restrict the reach of tribal power by reducing the size of
the reservation down to the lands owned and occupied by Indians or the tribe itself. I call Montana and Bourland "diminishment" cases because in a very real though intangible way, they
reduce the "size" of the reservation by reducing the length of
the tribe's jurisdictional reach. This is judicial diminishment
because it pre-empts legislative prerogative. In other words,

72. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 586-87 (1977) (emphasis added).
73. South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. 2309, 2316 n.9 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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Bourland did not show enough deference to the Court's own
analysis in Hagen or, more precisely, in Bartlett. Congress did
not reduce the "size" of the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation,
so the Court went ahead and did it on its own.
JUDICIAL RELUCTANCE AND MODERN DEMOGRAPHY

But there is another level on which Bourland, Hagen and
Bartlett are all consistent: judicial reluctance to allow tribal law
to apply to non-Indians is a function of modern demography.
The Bourland Court seems to be saying that Bartlett was correct, insofar as the lands opened for homesteading in 1908 are
still mainly Indian, notwithstanding the homesteading. On the
other hand, most of those recreating on the Oahe Reservoir are
non-Indians, and the Court was reluctant to allow tribal law to
reach these non-Indians. Therefore, when the issue in Bourland
became the ability of the tribe to license or exclude non-members from the Reservoir, modern demography elevated judicial
reluctance and the injunction issued.
As little as modern demography has to do with acceptable
principles of construction of statutes passed when the demographics were different, there is a modicum of sense to the
relationship between demography and judicial reluctance. Different rules govern on the opposite sides of reservation boundaries; whether the difference is a greater respect for the status
of elders,74 or a lesser devotion to Miranda warnings;" a
greater deference to the rights of surface owners over the owners of the mineral estate, or a lesser respect for the social utility of trade unions. 6 Tribes do things differently from the rest
of us; if that were not the case, then all the fuss about tribal
sovereignty would be over nothing. In fact, almost all of what
we know about American Indian law is about difference.

74. See Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 26 (D. Ariz. 1969). This was the very first
reported ICRA federal court case, wherein a legal services lawyer was expelled from
the Navajo reservation for laughing during a Tribal Council meeting. Here, the district court held that expelling a lawyer for laughing abridged free speech. Id. at 320.
75. See United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1989).
76. See P.S. Deloria et al., Litigating an Indian Jurisdiction Case: Where Must
You Go First?, 71 N.D. L. REV. 313, 322-23 (1995) (remarks of Professor Laurence).
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Tribes have the right "to make their own laws and be ruled
by them." If those rules are the same as the dominant society's
rules, then there are few problems in their application. If those
rules are applicable only to tribal members, then, likewise,
most of the problems disappear, or at least can be handled
internally. New problems arise when the tribe has different
ways of doing things and wishes to apply those different ways
against the interests of non-members.
Many of those "problems" are illusory, perceived by people
looking at tribal law through lenses distorted by stereotype,
racism or xenophobia. Many of the differences between tribal
ways and dominant-society ways are minor or benign; few are
draconian; fewer are malignant. The problems of cross-boundary
differences are often exaggerated, sometimes intentionally. Saying that there is a "modicum" of sense to judicial reluctance to
allow tribal rules to apply to non-Indians is not to say that
there is a surfeit of sense, or to say that the modicum justifies
the abandonment by the federal courts of the notion that tribal
law might apply to non-members. Montana, even as advanced
by Bourland, did not take reluctance quite to the extreme.
Theoretically, at least, and putting aside Justice Thomas's unwarranted overstatement of the Montana result, the two Montana exceptions could still be read broadly.
But will courts read the exceptions broadly? Probably not, if I
am right about judicial reluctance being a function of modern
demographics. Montana pinches at exactly the place where
judicial reluctance is at its greatest-the application of tribal
law to non-Indians. But the Montana exceptions must be read
broadly, or the tribes are left with laws that apply only to
themselves. This is not true self-determination, anymore than it
would be true self-determination for Virginia if its laws applied
only to Virginians and not to tourists. Or that it would be true
self-determination for Singapore if its laws applied only to
Singaporeans. They don't; ask Michael Faye.
Thus, with Bourland, we approach the critical point with
respect to tribal self-governance. Governments apply their laws
to non-citizens, even when those laws are substantially different
from what the visitors are used to at home. So Bourland
threatens the very core of self-governance. Yet, the judicial
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reluctance to allow that application is sensible, at least to some
extent, and at least where tribal laws are different from important dominant-society norms.
Thus, as pointed out so effectively some time ago by Professor Judith Resnik, with Indian law, as with federalism itself,
the question always becomes the extent that the society at
large will tolerate deviations of its own closely held norms."
There is a tension between the forces of diversity and the forces
of uniformity, between the desire to let a portion of the population go about its unique ways and the desire that, to some
extent at least, we are all in this enterprise together. The question always becomes whether or not, and how if at all, the
center will govern the provinces.
This
dilemma is solved, perhaps, by the Indian Civil Rights
78
Act.
THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT

The Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) was passed by Congress
in 1968, a very delayed reaction to the case of Talton v.
Mayes,79 which held that the U.S. Constitution does not work
to bind tribal activity. The ICRA imposes on the tribes Constitution-like restrictions, largely protective of the individual
rights that the dominant society holds dear. Its protections are
available to all against whom tribal power is exerted, Indian
and non-Indian alike.
But, in the decade after its passage, most of the cases decided by the federal courts were brought by Indians against their
own tribes. In 1978, in the famous case of Santa Clara Pueblo
v. Martinez,0 the Supreme Court found that the ICRA did not
create a civil cause of action for suit in federal court, and effectively limited its federal court application to habeas corpus

77. Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States and the Federal
Courts, 56 U. Cm.L. REV. 671 (1989).
78. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1994).
79. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
80. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
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cases.81 Federal court ICRA cases have been few since Martinez; they remain more common in tribal court.
The ICRA is the kind of statute that is needed to give an
outlet to the judicial reluctance to allow the application of tribal
law to non-Indians. Montana, reacting (and Bourland, overreacting) to this reluctance, attacked the very existence of tribal
power over non-Indians; the ICRA controls the exercise of that
power. With an effective, civil-side ICRA to ensure what the
dominant-society's judge sees as the fundamental fairness of the
exercise of tribal civil process, judges should be less reluctant to
allow the power to apply--differently, but still fairly-to nonIndians.
Two things are required of a statute that can save tribal
power over non-Indians, yet recognize the legitimacy of the
judicial reluctance to allow tribal power to reach non-Indians.
First, the statute must embody the rules that are of fundamental importance to the dominant society.
Of course, there is "importance" and there is "importance."
The Salman Rushdie affair showed that the idea of Iran's extra-territorial use of the death penalty to punish blasphemy
was fundamentally abhorrent to our dominant society. Few
other deviations from our own norms rise to that level, however, and the dominant society has shown itself of various minds
lately regarding, for example, the caning of Michael Faye, the
double prosecution of Rodney King's tormentors, and the forced
integration of The Citadel. The statute that we are contemplating to control the exercise of tribal power over non-Indians,
then, must pick carefully the matters that are important
enough to the dominant society to justify the imposition of its
younger ways on the older tribal society. The matters may not
necessarily be so important, perhaps, as to justify the armed
invasion of Iraq, but sufficiently important for Congress to act
under its plenary power with respect to the Indian tribes which
are within the United States' jurisdiction.

81. Id. at 61. The explicit habeas corpus provision of the ICRA is found at 25
U.S.C. § 1303 (1994).
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Second, and of equal consequence, the statute must accept
and honor the propriety of tribal differences from dominant
society ways. A statute that does not tolerate differences destroys self-governance as effectively as Bourland. "It must always be remembered that the various Indian tribes were once
independent and sovereign nations, and that their claim to
sovereignty long predates that of our own Government."8 2 And
these purposes must be advanced simultaneously. The statute
must tolerate differences at the same time that it defines similarities. Without such a balance, the compromise will not work.
Tribal self-governance must be retained, but judicial reluctance
to allow tribal law to apply to non-Indians will find some outlet,
and if it is not through this statute, then it will be through
Bourland's untimely destruction of tribal power itself.
The ICRA, as presently written and as construed by the
federal courts between 1968 and 1978, is a decent statute to
accomplish these two purposes. The statute embodies most of
the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, which seems
a suitable list of the dominant society's most basic and widely
held beliefs. On the other hand, most pre-Martinez courts
agreed that the ICRA did not impose on the tribes a full measure of constitutional due process or the full weight of other
constitutional provisions.'m It could be amended to be more
precise regarding where it deviates from constitutional norms,
or Congress could start from scratch, but I am inclined to think
otherwise." As construed by sensible, albeit dominant-society,
judges, the ICRA could serve the purposes of legitimatizing, yet
re-directing, the judicial reluctance that we saw misdirected to-

82. McClanahan v. State Tax Com'mn of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
83. The best evidence of this proposition is seen in the two lower Martinez opinions in which the courts reached the merits, but neither required under the ICRA
what the Constitution would require in terms of gender neutrality. See Martinez v.
Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp. 5 (D.N.M. 1975), rev'd, 540 F.2d 1039 (10th Cir.
1976), rev'd 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
84. I am more an admirer of the common law, as applied by sensible, fair judges,
than I am of hyper-precise statutes. See Robert Laurence, A Section-by-Section Chart
Summarizing the Recent Changes in the Federal Bankruptcy Code, Affixed to a Short
Essay in Praise of the Sensibility of Judges and in Derogation of Small Roman Numerals, Jurisprudentially Significant Hyphens, and Title V of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1994, 47 ARK. L. REV. 857 (1994).

808

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:781

ward the destruction of the tribal land base in Hagen, and
toward the destruction of tribal power itself in Bourland.
If the ICRA is the antidote to the dominant society's overly
energetic judicial reluctance to allow tribal law to apply to nonIndians, then it would appear that the statute would have only
limited relevance to the question in which the ICRA was most
often raised pre-Martinez; that is, where the tribe is applying
its own laws to its own members. Does the Indian Civil Rights
Act, as offered in this essay, actually give more protection to
non-Indians than it does to Indians? The ICRA is little-enough
respected by some tribal advocates as it is; sample Professor
Robert A. Williams, Jr.'s stunning characterization: "a highly
efficient process of legal auto-genocide, the ultimate hegemonic
effect of which is to instruct the savage to self-extinguish all
troublesome expression of difference that diverge from the white
man's own hierarchic, universalized world view."5 Legal autogenocide? How can it even be suggested in a principled way
that such a statute can be used at all, let alone used more by
non-Indians than by tribal members?
In the first place, note that I have already suggested such a
use for the ICRA in previous articles about the problem of the
cross-boundary enforcement of state and tribal judgments. 6
The analytical model I have proposed for that problem-the socalled "asymmetric" model-assigns a role to the ICRA in the
enforcement of a tribal judgment in state court, almost always
against a non-Indian defendant. But this model removes that
role when a state court judgment is enforced in tribal court,
almost always against an Indian defendant.
The present proposal continues that asymmetry. When Indians find themselves subject to state or federal court jurisdiction, their civil rights are protected not by the ICRA, but by
more general federal civil rights laws, by their American citizenship and by the Fourteenth Amendment "personhood" of
85. Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail
of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS.
L. REV. 219, 274 (emphasis added).
86. See, e.g., Robert Laurence, The Bothersome Need For Asymmetry in Any Federally Dictated Rule of Recognition For the Enforcement of Money Judgments Across
Indian Reservation Boundaries, 27 CONN. L. REV. 979 (1995).
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Indians. Are these protections sufficient to guarantee in practical, real-world fact, a shipshape, non-discriminatory off-reservation environment for Indians? No. Read the newspapers. Visit
Gallup, New Mexico or Rapid City, South Dakota. But, the
difficulties that Indians face in the fair administration of offreservation justice are fundamentally different from the difficulties faced by non-Indians in tribal court. An asymmetric solution to the two sets of difficulties is appropriate.
When non-Indians are in tribal court, the protection of citizenship disappears, as the non-Indians are not, and in most
cases cannot become, members of the tribe. Also, the protection
of the Fourteenth Amendment disappears under the sensible
holding of Talton v. Mayes.87 However, the non-Indian has
ICRA "personhood" to protect him, her, or it against abuses of
tribal civil justice, "abuses" defined from a largely dominantsociety perspective. It is the thesis of this article that with the
ICRA in place to give protection in federal court to congressionally mandated civil rights, the dominant society's courts
should be less reluctant to allow tribal law to reach non-Indians. And, since it is this judicial reluctance that has caused the
widespread deterioration of tribal land and tribal power, an
active civil-side ICRA should result in a greater recognition of
tribal power in the dominant society's courts.
But then, how should the ICRA be interpreted when it is an
Indian plaintiff complaining about the application of tribal law
to him, her or it? Here there is less dominant-society judicial
reluctance to cut back on the reach of tribal power, although,
as Martinez always reminds us, some tribal actions, even toward members, are beyond-or at least close to--the pale. And,
if an active ICRA is premised on its being an antidote to judicial reluctance to acknowledge tribal power, does that mean
that in the absence of such reluctance the statute gives less
protection?
Yes, it should mean that, and as a practical matter, that
means in turn that the application of the ICRA will be asymmetric as to Indians and non-Indians. Again, though, the asym-

87. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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metry is not unprincipled; the ICRA should be interpreted with
a political question doctrine more aggressive than that used by
the federal courts under the United States Constitution.
Before the Supreme Court in Martinez removed the ICRA
from federal courtrooms, most of the cases were brought by
Indian plaintiffs suing their own tribes over what might legitimately be called political questions: controversies involving
membership requirements,8 8 voting eligibility,8 9 reservation
districting and other election matters, ° tribal governance9
and the like. Martinez, itself, involved the most intimate questions of what it means to be Santa Claran and implicated
complicated matters of tribal history, custom and tradition.
Closely held tribal beliefs and long-standing tribal ways were
before the federal judges, as much as the meaning of the federal statute.9 2
From the perspective of nearly twenty years since Martinez,
the Supreme Court was largely correct in removing such issues
from the federal courtroom, in the absence of a very precise
command by the Congress that these cases be taken. However,
the same federal judicial laissez fair result could have been
reached under an active ICRA political question doctrine. Recall
how close the Supreme Court came to declaring legislative reapportionment to be beyond the competence of judicial determination.9" By instituting a serious judicial reluctance to tamper
with matters of internal tribal government under ICRA, the
Court could retain most of the good of Martinez. But, when the
tribe applies its power to non-Indians, more than literally self-

88. See, e.g., Slattery v. Arapahoe Tribal Council, 453 F.2d 278 (10th Cir. 1971).
89. See, e.g., Two Hawk v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 534 F.2d 101 (8th Cir. 1976).
90. See, e.g., White Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1973).
91. See, e.g., Johnson v. Lower Elwha Tribal Community, 484 F.2d 200 (9th Cir.
1973).
92. See Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp. 5 (D.N.M. 1975), rev'd, 540
F.2d 1039 (10th Cir. 1976), rev'd 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
93. In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Supreme Court took 29 pages of
the U.S. Reports to dispense with the political question issue. Id. at 208-37. (These
pages include a discussion of the Indian cases at 215-17). Justice Douglas added nine
more pages in his concurring opinion. Id. at 241-50. Justice Clark added two more.
Id. at 251-53. Justice Frankfurter offered 64 pages in a wide-ranging dissent. Id. at
266-330. Justice Harlan, also in dissent, added ten pages, mostly on the merits of the
case. Id. at 330-40.
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determination is involved. The political question doctrine loses a
large part of its force, and the ICRA comes into play. Of course,
also coming into play under this approach, is tribal power over
non-Indians, which emphatically exists, though subject to federal court ICRA review.
Thus can be seen the essential proposition of the present
essay: the reluctance of the dominant society's courts that we
have seen in this area of Indian law, while over-stated and misdirected, is sensible. Given the presence on this continent of
both new immigrant and ancient American governments, differences will be inherent in tribal law-making. It is too much to
ask the dominant society to ignore these differences, or pretend
they do not matter, especially when the laws are being applied
to non-Indians. The ICRA could well serve as a check on any
perceived unfairness in the application of tribal law to nonmembers. Differences between the ICRA's rules, the dominant
society's usual rules and tribal rules are under the control of
Congress, as is, ultimately, the size and existence of the tribe's
reservation itself. With a careful ICRA regime in place, the
reluctance of the courts should then be re-directed away from
the reluctance to apply tribal law to non-members and toward a
reluctance to insert the ICRA intrusively into the internal selfgoverning mechanisms of the tribe. We end with an internally
consistent, though asymmetric, scheme of analysis of what it
means for a tribe to make its own laws and be ruled by them.
CONCLUSION

Clea to Darley: "I think, my dear, you have a mania for
exactitude and an impatience with partial knowledge which
is... well, unfair to knowledge itself. How can it be anything
but imperfect?"94 Clea's wisdom, in this and other matters, is
94. LAWRENCE DURRELL, CLEA 119 (1961) (ellipsis in the original); see also JAMES
GLEICK, GENIUS: THE LIFE AND SCIENCE OF RICHARD FEYNMAN (1992):

[Feynman] believed in the primacy of doubt, not as a blemish upon our
ability to know but as the essence of knowing. The alternative to uncertainty is authority, against which science had fought for centuries. "Great
value of a satisfactory philosophy of ignorance," he jotted on a sheet of
notepaper one day. " . . teach how doubt is not to be feared but welcomed."
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disregarded at one's peril, and I have conformed to it in this
short article. There is much left to be done before there is anything like a "perfect" theory of the legitimacy of the application
of tribal law to non-Indians, even assuming that Clea is wrong
and that there is such a thing as a "perfect" theory. The two
tidy solutions-(1) that the power exists in tribes to control the
civil-side lives of non-Indian residents of and visitors to the
reservation and that this is the business of the dominant society only in a theoretical sense or (2) that such power does not
exist, and "self-government" means solely the power to govern
oneself-are not satisfactory, except to those who equate "satisfactory" with "simple" and "profound" with "concise." The first of
those tidy solutions turns the San Juan Pueblo into the jurisdictional equivalent of Singapore; the second turns it into the
San Juan Indian Club. The first is unrealistic; the second is
destructive. The first is science fiction; the second is disreputable history.
What I have proposed here is forthrightly somewhere in between, hence unattractive to proponents of either of the tidy
solutions. Some may call it unprincipled, compromised, or imperfect. Outspoken protectors of tribal sovereignty, distrustful of
my principles or motives, may call it racist; outspoken detractors of tribal sovereignty, distrustful in the other direction, may
Id. at 371-72 (ellipsis in the original). Gleick also quotes Quine: "I think that for
scientific and philosophical purposes the best we can do is give up the notion of
knowledge as a bad job. .. ." Id. at 371 (quoting W.V. QINE, QUIDDmTIEs: AN INTERMITTENTLY PHILOSOPHICAL DICTIONARY 109 (1987)).
See generally JOHN DEWEY, THE QUEST FOR CERTAINTY: A STUDY OF THE RELATION OF KNOWLEDGE AND ACTION 227-28 (1929):
The concrete pathologies of belief, its failures and perversions,
whether of defect or excess, spring from failure to observe and adhere to
the principle that knowledge is completed resolution of the inherently
indeterminate or doubtful. The commonest fallacy is to suppose that since
the state of doubt is accompanied by a feeling of uncertainty, knowledge
arises when this feeling gives way to one of assurance. . . . A disciplined
mind takes delight in the problematic, and cherishes it until a way out
is found that approves itself upon examination. The questionable becomes
an active questioning, a search; desire for the emotion of certitude gives
place to quest for the objects by which the obscure and unsettled may be
developed into the stable and clear. The scientific attitude may almost be
defined as that which is capable of enjoying the doubtful; scientific method is, in one aspect, a technique for making a productive use of doubt by
converting it into operations of definite inquiry.
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call it affirmative action. 5 But Clea might call it just imperfect enough to be fair to knowledge itself, which is enough for
me.

95. See Phillip Win. Lear and Blake D. Miller, Exhaustion of Tribal Court Remedies: Rejecting Bright-Line Rules and Affirmative Action, 71 N.D. L. REV. 277 (1995).
Rarely has the term "affirmative action" been used so forthrightly to describe the
federal rules of tribal jurisdiction and, of course, the authors mean the term in its
worst, not its best, sense. One could as easily say that the substantial deference that
the federal courts show to state process, see, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971), is "affirmative action" for state courts, or, on an international level, that the
partition by the United Nations of Palestine was "affirmative action" for Jews. In my
view, the use of the term does not advance the discussion at all.

